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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF  
SCHOOL & CAMPUS  
POLICE CHIEFS



# *SCHOOL SHOOTINGS - LEADING THE WAY IN THE NEW NORMAL*

TIMOTHY ENOS

CHIEF OF POLICE (RETIRED)

SARASOTA COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT


POLICE DEPARTMENT

SARASOTA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD

SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER DISTRICT 5

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















# 2021 SCHOOL SHOOTINGS

- 34 SCHOOL SHOOTINGS WITH INJURIES OR DEATHS
- 68 PEOPLE KILLED OR INJURED IN A SCHOOL SHOOTING
- 14 PEOPLE KILLED
- 34 PEOPLE INJURED
- 11 STUDENTS OR OTHER CHILDREN KILLED
- 3 SCHOOL EMPLOYEES OR OTHER ADULTS KILLED





# 2022 SCHOOL SHOOTINGS

## Injuries & Deaths

**46** School shootings with injuries or deaths

**131** People killed or injured in a school shooting

**36** People killed

**29** Students or other children killed

**7** School employees or other adults killed


**95** People injured

There have been 46 school shootings this year that resulted in injuries or deaths, the most in a single year since Education Week began tracking such incidents in 2018. There have been 133 such shootings since 2018. Prior to 2022, the highest number of school shootings with injuries or deaths was last year when there were 35. There were 10 in 2020, and 24 each in 2019 and 2018.



## Where the Shootings Happened

*The size of the dots correlates to the number of people killed or injured. Click on each dot for more information.*



# 2023 SCHOOL SHOOTINGS

## **Injuries & Deaths**

**24** School shootings with injuries or deaths

**35** People killed or injured in a school shooting

**13** People killed

**9** Students or other children killed

**4** School employees or other adults killed

**22** People injured






Date	School or District Name	City	About the Incident	People Killed or Injured	People Killed	Students/Other Children Killed	School Employees/Other Adults Killed	People Injured
5/24	Oliver Citywide Academy	Pittsburgh, Pa.	A student was shot and killed outside the school.	1	1	1	0	0
5/22	KIPP DC College Preparatory	Washington, D.C.	A student was shot and injured outside the school.	1	0	0	0	1
5/18	Garfield High School	Seattle, Wash.	A 19-year-old was shot and injured in the parking lot of the school, while sports practices were underway.	1	0	0	0	1
5/17	Theodore Roosevelt High School	Washington, D.C.	A 17-year-old student was shot and killed in the school parking lot.	1	1	1	0	0
5/16	Eakin Elementary School	Columbus, Ohio	A 12-year-old boy was shot and injured outside the school during dismissal.	1	0	0	0	1
5/8	Von Tobel Middle School	Las Vegas, Nev.	A school employee was injured by a stray bullet while outside on campus.	1	0	0	0	1



# US DOJ FBI ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS 2000-2019

## Education Environments

Education Environments Shooter Outcomes



Education Environments Shooter Outcomes: Suicide at the scene before police arrived (10); Suicide at the scene after police arrived (8); Suicide at another location (2); Killed by police at the scene (3); Apprehended by police at the scene (including 19 restrained by citizens) (36); Apprehended by police at another location (5)

## Key Findings:




Incidents: 62. Total casualties: 419. Killed: 179 (including 178 civilians and 1 unarmed security guard). Wounded: 240 (including 237 civilians, 2 law enforcement officers, and 1 unarmed security guard). Number of shooters: 64. Shooter gender: 62 male, 2 female. Shooter ages: Preteens (2); Teens (36); 20s (11); 30s (4); 40s (7); 50s (3); 60s (1).


## Education Environments

### Quick Look:

Sixty-two incidents occurred in public and private educational settings, defined as schools covering pre-kindergarten to 12th grade, institutes of higher education, and school board meetings.



Education Environment Incidents and Casualties by Location: School Board Meeting (2 incidents, 1 wounded, 0 killed); Elementary (6 incidents, 25 wounded, 36 killed); Middle School (8 incidents, 11 wounded, 2 killed); High School (25 incidents, 104 wounded, 60 killed); Pre-K-12 (2 incidents, 13 wounded, 6 killed); Jr./Sr. High School (1 incident, 4 wounded, 0 killed); Higher Education (18 incidents, 82 wounded, 75 killed)



Education Environments Casualties by Year: 2001 (2 killed, 18 wounded); 2002 (6 killed, 3 wounded); 2003 (4 killed, 3 wounded); 2004 (0 killed, 1 wounded); 2005 (10 killed, 8 wounded); 2006 (9 killed, 16 wounded); 2007 (32 killed, 21 wounded); 2008 (7 killed, 16 wounded); 2009 (0 killed, 2 wounded); 2010 (4 killed, 10 wounded); 2011 (1 killed, 1 wounded); 2012 (38 killed, 16 wounded); 2013 (7 killed, 10 wounded); 2014 (6 killed, 13 wounded); 2015 (9 killed, 7 wounded); 2016 (2 killed, 9 wounded); 2017 (8 killed, 19 wounded); 2018 (29 killed, 52 wounded); 2019 (5 killed, 15 wounded)



# EVERY SCHOOL IS UNIQUE

- URBAN, SUBURBAN, RURAL
- LARGE TO SMALL
- PRESCHOOL, ELEMENTARY, MIDDLE, HIGH, COLLEGE
- PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
- OPEN CAMPUS OR CLOSED
- RICH TO POOR

DETECT-DELAY-RESPOND-DEFEND-RECOVER

RUN-HIDE-FIGHT

- LOOK FOR THE DANGER AS FAR OUT AS POSSIBLE
- IF THE THREAT DEVELOPS, TRY DELAYING IT UNTIL IT CAN BE STOPPED
- HAVE A WAY TO STOP THE THREAT
- LIMIT THE DAMAGE AND INJURY



#	Name	Date	Year	Location	Country	Killed	Injured	W	Perpetrator	Fate of perpetrator(s)	Ref.
1.	<a href="#">Beslan school siege</a>	Sep 1	2004	<a href="#">Beslan, North Ossetia-Alania</a>	<a href="#">Russia</a>	385	783	FME	<a href="#">Riyad-us Saliheen Brigade of Martyrs</a>	Most killed by special forces, <a href="#">one captured</a> and subsequently sentenced to <a href="#">life imprisonment</a>	









# DEADLIEST SCHOOL SHOOTINGS US

Date	Location	Deaths	Injuries	Description
April 16, 2007	<a href="#">Blacksburg, Virginia</a>	33 <sup>[n 1]</sup>	17	<a href="#">Virginia Tech shooting</a> : 23-year-old student <a href="#">Seung-Hui Cho</a> killed thirty-two students and faculty members in two separate attacks on the campus of <a href="#">Virginia Tech</a> and then committed suicide. In a dorm room, he first shot one student, then another who came to help; two hours later, he went to a school building where he barricaded the main entrance and fired into several classrooms, killing twenty-five students and five faculty members and wounding seventeen others. The incident was formerly the deadliest American mass shooting and is currently the third-deadliest.
December 14, 2012	<a href="#">Newtown, Connecticut</a>	28 <sup>[n 1]</sup>	2	<a href="#">Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting</a> : 20-year-old Adam Lanza killed twenty-seven people and himself. He first killed his mother at their shared home before taking her guns and driving to his former elementary school. Lanza brought four guns with him. He killed twenty first-grade children aged six and seven, along with six adults, including four teachers, the principal, and the school psychologist. Two other people were injured. Lanza then killed himself as police arrived at the school. <sup>[1][2]</sup>
May 24, 2022	<a href="#">Uvalde, Texas</a>	22 <sup>[n 1]</sup>	18	<a href="#">Robb Elementary School shooting</a> : 18-year-old Salvador Ramos entered the school and barricaded himself in one of the classrooms, shooting the children and staff in the classroom, before the trading fire with responding law enforcement officers that had arrived on the scene and hour prior, however never entered. Two officers were left with minor injuries and no deaths. Ramos was shot and killed by a tactical team of <a href="#">US Border Patrol</a> agents and UCISD officers after they breached the classroom. Twenty-one people were killed by Ramos; 19 students between the ages of 7 and 10, and 2 teachers. The assailant also shot but did not kill his grandmother, who remains in hospital in critical condition. <sup>[3][4]</sup>
August 1, 1966	<a href="#">Austin, Texas</a>	18 <sup>[n 1]</sup>	31	<a href="#">University of Texas tower shooting</a> : 25-year-old engineering student and former U.S. Marine <a href="#">Charles Whitman</a> got onto the clock tower at the <a href="#">University of Texas-Austin</a> . After killing three people inside the tower, he began firing outside from the observation deck atop it, killing a further twelve people and wounding 31 others during a 96-minute shooting rampage which lasted until he was shot and killed by police. He had earlier murdered his wife and mother at their homes. <sup>[5][6][7]</sup> Apart from remaining the deadliest shooting at a college campus until 2007 (see above), this was also the deadliest American mass shooting altogether for <a href="#">nearly 18 years</a> .
February 14, 2018	<a href="#">Parkland, Florida</a>	17	17	<a href="#">Stoneman Douglas High School shooting</a> : Nikolas Cruz, a 19-year-old former student whose behavior had led to his expulsion, began shooting students and staff members with a semi-automatic rifle at <a href="#">Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School</a> after activating a <a href="#">fire alarm</a> . 17 people were killed, and 17 others were injured. The suspect blended in with the crowd of fleeing students and was arrested in a residential area neighboring <a href="#">Coral Springs</a> after walking away from the school. <sup>[8]</sup> He was later charged with murder and attempted murder. <sup>[9]</sup>
April 20, 1999	<a href="#">Columbine, Colorado</a>	15 <sup>[n 2]</sup>	21	<a href="#">Columbine High School massacre</a> : 18-year-old <a href="#">Eric Harris</a> and 17-year-old <a href="#">Dylan Klebold</a> , students at <a href="#">Columbine High School</a> , killed twelve students and one teacher; after killing two students in the schoolyard and fatally wounding a teacher in the hallway, they killed the rest of their victims in the school library. They also wounded 21 additional people (twelve in the library and nine elsewhere), started fires, and engaged in several gunfights with police, though no one was hit in these exchanges. Another three people injured themselves attempting to escape the school. The pair committed suicide at the end of the massacre. <sup>[10][11]</sup>




# VIRGINIA TECH UNIVERSITY

## APRIL 16, 2007

### Seung-Hui Cho

- Born January 18, 1984 in Seoul, South Korea
- Senior level Undergraduate student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
- Diagnosed with a severe anxiety disorder known as selective mutism, as well as major depressive disorder in middle school
- During last two years at Virginia Tech, several instances of abnormal behavior, as well as plays and other writings submitted containing references to violence, caused concern among teachers and classmates
- Accused of stalking two female students at Virginia Tech
- Committed suicide on April 16, 2007 after going on a shooting rampage at Virginia Tech killing 32 and wounded 25 others



 **NBC NEWS**





# SANDY HOOK ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

## DECEMBER 14, 2012



### Adam Lanza

#### Biography

Adam Lanza shot and killed 20 first-graders and six adults at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, on December 14, 2012, before shooting himself.

#### QUICK FACTS

Adam Lanza  
Adam Peter Lanza

**WHO WAS ADAM LANZA?**  
**CITE THIS PAGE**



**COMMENT**

Adam Lanza shot and killed 20 first-graders and six adults at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, on December 14, 2012, before shooting himself.

### Who Was Adam Lanza?

Adam Lanza is believed to have shot his mother, Nancy Lanza, in the head at her home in Newtown, Connecticut, on December 14, 2012, before traveling to the nearby Sandy Hook Elementary School, where he shot and killed 20 students between the ages of 5 and 10, and six adult workers. According to police reports, Lanza then turned the gun on himself, fatally shooting himself in the head.



# SANDY HOOK ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

## DECEMBER 14, 2012







# ROBB ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

## MAY 24, 2022

### ***Demographics***

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**Attack Date & Time:** 05/24/22 at 1128 hours (time of crash)

**Death & Injuries:** 21 dead (19 children/2 adults) Injured: 17

**School Address:** 715 Old Carrizo Rd, Uvalde, Texas

**Uvalde Independent School District:** 9 school buildings in the district

**Uvalde Consolidated ISD Police Dept:** One (1) Chief, one (1) Lieutenant/Detective, four (4) SROs

**Robb Elementary:** 2nd-4th grade

**Robb Elementary Classroom Count:** 10-(2nd) grade, 11-(3rd) grade, 10-(4th) grade

**Student Teacher Ratio:** Average 20:1

**Robb elementary:** Over 600 students and about 65 staff (waiting on confirmation)

**Suspect:** Salvador Ronaldo, 18-yr-old 5'7" tall, 110 pound male; senior in high school/drop-out

**Suspect's Address:** 552 Diaz Street, Uvalde Texas (lived with grandma)

**Commanding Officer:** Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Chief Pete Arredondo



Suspect brought 2 AR15s, but left one at the crash site

Suspect brought over 1,600 rounds but left 900 at the crash site

Suspect brought over 58 magazines and left 15 at the crash site

Suspect had 22 spent shell casings outside

Suspect had 142 spent shell casings inside

Suspect left 173 live rounds inside

Police had 35 spent shell casing inside the school, 8 were in the hallway

Police had no spent shell casings outside of the school

*\*This information was reported by Texas DPS*

Started at 1128

Ended at 1251

# INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE ON THE ROBB ELEMENTARY SHOOTING TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

THE SCHOOL'S FIVE-FOOT TALL EXTERIOR FENCE WAS INADEQUATE TO MEANINGFULLY IMPEDE AN INTRUDER. WHILE THE SCHOOL HAD ADOPTED SECURITY POLICIES TO LOCK EXTERIOR DOORS AND INTERNAL CLASSROOM DOORS, THERE WAS A REGRETTABLE CULTURE OF NONCOMPLIANCE BY SCHOOL PERSONNEL WHO FREQUENTLY PROPPED DOORS OPEN AND DELIBERATELY CIRCUMVENTED LOCKS.

- SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS AND SCHOOL DISTRICT POLICE TACITLY CONDONED THIS BEHAVIOR
- WITH RESPECT TO SECURING DOORS, THE ACTIVE SHOOTER POLICY STATED:  
  
STAFF WILL CONDUCT INSPECTIONS OF CLASSROOMS TO MAKE SURE DOORS AND WINDOWS CAN BE SECURED ... .DOORS TO ALL CLASSROOMS WILL REMAIN LOCKED DURING INSTRUCTION AND THE CAMPUSES WILL HAVE ONE MAIN ENTRY POINT TO THE SCHOOL. *EACH STAFF MEMBER WILL KNOW THE PROCEDURES TO FOLLOW IN ORDER TO HAVE ANY DOOR OR WINDOW REPAIRED THAT WILL NOT LOCK.*<sup>15</sup>
- OF THE OVER 50 KEYS THAT HE CARRIED WITH HIM, LT. HERNANDEZ TESTIFIED THAT HE HAD A ROBB ELEMENTARY MASTER
- KEY THAT HAD WORKED, ALTHOUGH SOMETIMES HE HAD TO JIGGLE KEYS TO MAKE THEM WORK. ADDITIONALLY, SOMETIMES STAFF WOULD CHANGE LOCKS WITHOUT NOTICE TO HIM.



THE FREQUENCY OF THESE “BAILOUT”-RELATED ALARMS—AROUND 50 OF THEM BETWEEN FEBRUARY AND MAY OF 2022—CONTRIBUTED TO A DIMINISHED SENSE OF VIGILANCE ABOUT RESPONDING TO SECURITY ALERTS.

- LOW- QUALITY INTERNET SERVICE, POOR MOBILE PHONE COVERAGE, AND VARYING HABITS OF MOBILE PHONE USAGE AT THE SCHOOL ALL LED TO INCONSISTENT RECEIPT OF THE LOCKDOWN NOTICE BY TEACHERS.

AT ROBB ELEMENTARY, LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONDERS FAILED TO ADHERE TO THEIR ACTIVE SHOOTER TRAINING, AND THEY FAILED TO PRIORITIZE SAVING THE LIVES OF INNOCENT VICTIMS OVER THEIR OWN SAFETY.

- THE VOID OF LEADERSHIP COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE LOSS OF LIFE AS INJURED VICTIMS WAITED OVER AN HOUR FOR HELP, AND THE ATTACKER CONTINUED TO SPORADICALLY FIRE HIS WEAPON.
- THIS SUGGESTS A TRAINING DEFICIENCY, IN THAT RESPONDING OFFICERS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY QUESTION THE ABSENCE OF COMMAND.

- PERIMETER FENCING – DALTON, ANTHON, AND ROBB HAVE FENCING THAT ENCLOSES THE CAMPUS IS DESIGNED TO LIMIT [SIC] AND/OR RESTRICT ACCESS TO INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT A NEED TO BE ON THE CAMPUS.
- RADIOS – KEY STAFF HAVE BEEN PROVIDED RADIOS TO SUPPORT CAMPUS COMMUNICATION PROCESSES.
- LOCKED CLASSROOM DOOR POLICY – TEACHERS ARE INSTRUCTED TO KEEP THEIR CLASSROOM DOORS CLOSED AND LOCKED AT ALL TIMES. BARRIERS ARE NOT TO BE USED. SUBSTITUTES SHALL FOLLOW THE SAME POLICY, WITH CAMPUSES ENSURING THEY HAVE ACCESS TO THE CLASSROOMS THEY NEED THROUGHOUT THE DAY. THE STANDARD RESPONSE PROTOCOL PROCEDURES ARE ON THE BACK OF ALL OF OUR BADGES ISSUED TO SUBSTITUTE TEACHERS.
- STAFF TRAINING – ALL STAFF MEMBERS ARE TRAINED ANNUALLY IN EMERGENCY PROTOCOLS FOR THE CAMPUS. KEY CAMPUS PERSONNEL ARE CPI-TRAINED.
- STUDENT TRAINING & DRILLS – STUDENTS RECEIVE TRAINING ON THE STANDARD RESPONSE PROTOCOL FOR LOCKOUT, LOCKDOWN, EVACUATE, SHELTER, AND HOLD. IN ADDITION, DRILLS ARE HELD FOR EACH OF THESE EMERGENCY ACTIONS ON A REGULAR BASIS .




- POLICE OFFICERS – THE DISTRICT EMPLOYS 4 OFFICERS. THIS INCLUDES A CHIEF, A DETECTIVE, AND TWO OFFICERS.<sup>17</sup>
- PARTNERSHIPS WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT. LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES ARE INVITED TO COME TO ANY OF OUR CAMPUSES WHILE THEY ARE ON PATROL. UCISD PROVIDES FREE BREAKFAST OR LUNCH TO ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL VISITING OUR CAMPUSES.
- THREAT ASSESSMENT TEAMS – EVERY CAMPUS EMPLOYS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY TEAM OF TRAINED PROFESSIONALS THAT CONVENE TO IDENTIFY, EVALUATE, CLASSIFY AND ADDRESS THREATS OR POTENTIAL THREATS TO SCHOOL SECURITY. FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT, THIS TEAM DETERMINES APPROPRIATE RESPONSE AND INTERVENTION. THIS INCLUDES NOTIFICATION AND INVOLVEMENT OF PARENTS, A SUICIDE RISK ASSESSMENT, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A WRITTEN SAFETY PLAN.
- SOCIAL MEDIA THREATS – UCISD UTILIZES SOCIAL SENTINEL TO MONITOR ALL SOCIAL MEDIA WITH A CONNECTION TO UVALDE AS A MEASURE TO IDENTIFY ANY POSSIBLE THREATS THAT MIGHT BE MADE AGAINST STUDENTS AND OR STAFF WITHIN THE SCHOOL DISTRICT.

- **THREAT REPORTING SYSTEM – STUDENTS, PARENTS, STAFF, AND COMMUNITY MEMBERS ARE ENCOURAGED TO SHARE INFORMATION WITH US THAT IS DEEMED TROUBLING, SO THAT WE MAY TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION. THIS INCLUDES INFORMATION ABOUT WEAPONS, THREATS, FIGHTS, DRUGS, SELF- HARM, SUICIDE OR DISCLOSURES MADE THAT ARE CONCERNING. REPORTS MAY BE MADE ONLINE AT UCISD.NET, BY CONTACTING ANY CAMPUS ADMINISTRATOR, DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR OR UCISD POLICE OFFICERS.**

ALERRT'S TRAINING PROGRAM IDENTIFIES THE CHALLENGE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONDERS OF POSSIBLY HAVING TO WORK "WITH A SMALL AD HOC TEAM OF INDIVIDUALS THEY MAY HAVE NEVER TRAINED WITH BEFORE," SUCH THAT "THE ONLY WAY TO SWING THE TACTICAL ADVANTAGE BACK IN FAVOR OF THE [LAW ENFORCEMENT] RESPONDER IS THROUGH THE USE OF EFFECTIVE TEAMWORK AND TACTICS."

THE ALERRT TRAINING ADVISES THAT "[T]HE INITIAL [LAW ENFORCEMENT] RESPONDER TO ARRIVE AT AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SCENE BECOMES THE INITIAL INCIDENT COMMANDER BY DEFAULT.





May 16, 2022—just one week before the shooting on May 24, 2022—he was finally able to purchase guns and ammunition. An online retailer shipped 1,740 rounds of 5.56mm 75-grain boat tail hollow point to his doorstep, at a cost of \$1,761.50. He ordered a Daniel Defense DDM4 V7 (an AR-15-style rifle) for shipment to a gun store in Uvalde, at a cost of \$2,054.28 (including tax and transfer fee). On May 17, 2022, he bought a Smith and Wesson M&P15 (also an AR-15-style rifle) at the same store in Uvalde, at a cost of \$1,081.42. He returned the next day for 375 rounds of M193, a 5.56mm 55-grain round with a full metal jacket, which has a soft core surrounded by a harder metal. He returned again to pick up his other rifle when it arrived on May 20, 2022, and he had store staff install the holographic sight on it after the transfer was completed.<sup>108</sup>

Just spent 1652 on ammo

and 2150 on some ar

Smhh 🏴‍☠️!



Givin me school shooter vibes





- DESPITE THE ACCOUNTS THAT SUGGEST BULLYING OF THE ATTACKER HAD BECOME A CONCERN BY THE FOURTH GRADE, IN NOTES FOUND ON HIS PHONE, HE DESCRIBED THEM AS BEGINNING IN MIDDLE SCHOOL.
- RECORDS SHOW THE ATTACKER HAD DECLINING ATTENDANCE, WITH MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED ABSENCES ANNUALLY BEGINNING IN 2018, ALONG WITH FAILING GRADES AND INCREASINGLY DISMAL PERFORMANCE ON STANDARDIZED AND END-OF-COURSE EXAMS. WHILE UVALDE CISD "SCHOOL SUCCESS OFFICERS" DO TRY TO BRING TRUANT CHILDREN BACK TO SCHOOL, MANY UVALDE STUDENTS HAVE SPOTTY ATTENDANCE, AND THE LOCAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM REPORTEDLY DOES NOT CONSISTENTLY ENFORCE TRUANCY RULES.
- THE ATTACKER DEVELOPED A FASCINATION WITH SCHOOL SHOOTINGS, OF WHICH HE MADE NO SECRET. HIS COMMENTS ABOUT THEM COUPLED WITH HIS WILD THREATS OF VIOLENCE AND RAPE EARNED HIM THE NICKNAME "YUBO'S SCHOOL SHOOTER" ON THAT PLATFORM. THOSE WITH WHOM HE PLAYED GAMES TAUNTED HIM WITH A SIMILAR NICKNAME SO OFTEN THAT IT BECAME A RUNNING JOKE. EVEN THOSE HE PERSONALLY KNEW IN HIS LOCAL CHAT GROUP BEGAN CALLING HIM "THE SCHOOL SHOOTER" AFTER HE SHARED PICTURES OF HIMSELF WEARING THE PLATE CARRIER HE'D BOUGHT AND POSING WITH A BB GUN HE TRIED TO CONVINCE THEM WAS REAL. NONE OF HIS ONLINE BEHAVIOR WAS EVER REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND IF IT WAS REPORTED BY OTHER USERS TO ANY SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORM, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT ACTIONS WERE TAKEN TO RESTRICT HIS ACCESS OR TO REPORT HIM TO AUTHORITIES AS A THREAT.

- “COACH SILVA TO OFFICE, SOMEBODY JUST JUMPED OVER THE FENCE AND HE'S SHOOTING.” SHE RAN TOWARD A GROUP OF THIRD GRADERS ON THE SCHOOL PLAYGROUND TO TELL THEM TO LOCK DOWN. SHE EXPECTED TO THEN HEAR AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF A LOCKDOWN, BUT SHE DID NOT HEAR ONE RIGHT AWAY.<sup>110</sup> MEANWHILE, THE ATTACKER PROCEEDED TO THE FOURTH GRADE TEACHERS' PARKING LOT, CONTINUING TO FIRE HIS GUN.
- PRIOR TO THE SUSPECT'S ENTRY INTO THE BUILDING AT 11:33:00, ACCORDING TO STATEMENTS, A UVALDE POLICE OFFICER ON SCENE AT THE CRASH SITE OBSERVED THE SUSPECT CARRYING A RIFLE OUTSIDE THE WEST HALL ENTRY. THE OFFICER, ARMED WITH A RIFLE, ASKED HIS SUPERVISOR FOR PERMISSION TO SHOOT THE SUSPECT. HOWEVER, THE SUPERVISOR EITHER DID NOT HEAR OR RESPONDED TOO LATE. THE OFFICER TURNED TO GET CONFIRMATION FROM HIS SUPERVISOR AND WHEN HE TURNED BACK TO ADDRESS THE SUSPECT, HE HAD ENTERED THE WEST HALLWAY UNABATED. (OS PER INVESTIGATING OFFICER INTERVIEW).
- PRINCIPAL MANDY GUTIERREZ HAD JUST FINISHED AN AWARDS CEREMONY AND WAS IN HER OFFICE WHEN SHE HEARD COACH SILVA'S REPORT OVER THE RADIO. SHE ATTEMPTED TO INITIATE A LOCKDOWN ON THE RAPTOR APPLICATION, BUT SHE HAD DIFFICULTY MAKING THE ALERT BECAUSE OF A BAD WI-FI SIGNAL.<sup>122</sup> SHE DID NOT ATTEMPT TO COMMUNICATE THE LOCKDOWN ALERT OVER THE SCHOOL'S INTERCOM.



- THE BREAKDOWN OF RESPONDERS, BY AGENCY, IS AS FOLLOWS: PARTIAL LIST

- TOTAL 376

91 TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

25 UVALDE POLICE DEPARTMENT

16 SAN ANTONIO POLICE DEPARTMENT (SWAT)

16 UVALDE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

14 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY – HIS

13 UNITED STATES MARSHALS

8 DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

7 FRIO COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

5 KINNEY COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

5 UVALDE CONSOLIDATED INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT

4 DILLEY POLICE DEPARTMENT

4 ZAVALA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

3 MEDINA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

3 SABINAL POLICE DEPARTMENT

2 CITY OF UVALDE FIRE MARSHALS

2 PEARSALL POLICE DEPARTMENT

2 TEXAS PARKS AND WILDLIFE

2 UVALDE COUNTY CONSTABLES

2 VAL VERDE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

1 FRIO COUNTY CONSTABLES

1 SOUTHWEST TEXAS JUNIOR COLLEGE

1 ZAVALA COUNTY CONSTABLES

- **1. UVALDE CISD AND ROBB ELEMENTARY**

- *COMMUNICATIONS AND LOCKDOWN ALERTS:*

- POOR WI-FI CONNECTIVITY IN ROBB ELEMENTARY LIKELY DELAYED THE LOCKDOWN ALERT THROUGH THE RAPTOR APPLICATION.
- ONCE THE ALERT WAS SENT, NOT ALL TEACHERS RECEIVED IT IMMEDIATELY FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS INCLUDING WI-FI COVERAGE, WHETHER THE TEACHER USED THE RAPTOR PHONE APPLICATION (AS OPPOSED TO LOGGING IN THROUGH A WEB BROWSER), AND WHETHER THE TEACHER WAS CARRYING A PHONE AT THE TIME.
- NO ONE USED THE SCHOOL INTERCOM AS ANOTHER MEANS TO COMMUNICATE THE LOCKDOWN.
- AS A RESULT, NOT ALL TEACHERS RECEIVED TIMELY NOTICE OF THE LOCKDOWN, INCLUDING THE TEACHER IN ROOM 111.

- *EFFECT OF BAILOUTS:*

- THE FREQUENCY OF LESS-SERIOUS BAILOUT-RELATED ALERTS IN UVALDE DILUTED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ALERTS AND DAMPENED EVERYONE'S READINESS TO ACT ON ALERTS.
- IN RESPONSE TO THE MAY 24, 2022, LOCKDOWN ALERT AT ROBB ELEMENTARY, THE INITIAL REACTION OF MANY ADMINISTRATORS, TEACHERS, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONDERS WAS THAT IT LIKELY WAS A LESS-DANGEROUS BAILOUT.

- *DOORS AND LOCKS:*

- ROBB ELEMENTARY HAD RECURRING PROBLEMS WITH MAINTAINING ITS DOORS

- *AND LOCKS.*

- IN PARTICULAR, THE LOCKING MECHANISM TO ROOM 111 WAS WIDELY KNOWN TO BE FAULTY, YET IT WAS NOT REPAIRED.



BASED ON THE FOREGOING INFORMATION DEVELOPED THROUGH ITS INVESTIGATION, THE COMMITTEE HAS DRAWN THE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS:

## ROBB CMTE RPT

2. NEVERTHELESS, NO ONE PLACED A WORK ORDER TO REPAIR THE LOCK— NOT THE PRINCIPAL, HER SECRETARY, THE TEACHER TO ROOM 111, OR ANYONE ELSE.

III. ROBB ELEMENTARY HAD A CULTURE OF NONCOMPLIANCE WITH SAFETY POLICIES

REQUIRING DOORS TO BE KEPT LOCKED, WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE FATAL. EXTERIOR DOORS.

TEACHERS AT ROBB ELEMENTARY OFTEN USED ROCKS TO PROP OPEN EXTERIOR DOORS. THE WEST DOOR TO THE WEST BUILDING WAS SUPPOSED TO BE CONTINUOUSLY LOCKED. WHEN THE ATTACKER APPROACHED ON MAY 24, 2022, IT WAS UNLOCKED, AND HE WAS ABLE TO ENTER THE BUILDING THERE.

IF THE DOOR HAD BEEN LOCKED AS POLICY REQUIRED, THE ATTACKER LIKELY WOULD HAVE BEEN SLOWED FOR SOME PERIOD OF TIME AS HE EITHER CIRCUMVENTED THE LOCK OR MOVED TO ANOTHER POINT OF ENTRY INTO THE BUILDING.

## INTERIOR CLASSROOM DOORS.

TEACHERS AT ROBB ELEMENTARY COMMONLY LEFT INTERIOR DOORS UNLOCKED FOR CONVENIENCE, AND THEY ALSO USED MAGNETS AND OTHER METHODS TO CIRCUMVENT DOOR LOCKS.

THE DOORS TO ROOMS 111 AND 112 WERE REQUIRED TO BE LOCKED AT ALL TIMES, AND IN A LOCKDOWN, THE TEACHERS WERE SUPPOSED TO CHECK THAT THEY WERE LOCKED.

A TEACHER IN ROOM 112 WAS SEEN LOCKING HER CLASSROOM DOOR AFTER THE LOCKDOWN ALERT.

THE DOOR TO ROOM 111 PROBABLY WAS NOT LOCKED. THE TEACHER IN ROOM 111 DOES NOT RECALL HEARING THE LOCKDOWN ALERT. THE DOOR REQUIRED SPECIAL EFFORT TO LOCK IT, AND THE TEACHER HAS NO MEMORY OF HAVING DONE SO. THE ATTACKER APPARENTLY DID NOT HAVE TO TAKE ANY ACTIONS TO OVERCOME A LOCKED DOOR BEFORE ENTERING THE CLASSROOMS.

IF THE DOOR TO ROOM 111 HAD BEEN LOCKED, THE ATTACKER LIKELY WOULD HAVE BEEN SLOWED FOR SOME TIME AS HE EITHER CIRCUMVENTED THE LOCK OR TOOK SOME OTHER ALTERNATIVE COURSE OF ACTION.



## 2. INFORMATION THAT WAS KNOWN OR KNOW ABLE ABOUT THE ATTACKER

### A. HOME AND FAMILY:

THE ATTACKER HAD AN UNSTABLE HOME LIFE WITH NO FATHER FIGURE AND A MOTHER STRUGGLING WITH A SUBSTANCE ABUSE DISORDER.

THE ATTACKER'S FAMILY MOVED OFTEN AND LIVED IN RELATIVE POVERTY.

THE ATTACKER DEVELOPED SOCIOPATHIC AND VIOLENT TENDENCIES, BUT HE RECEIVED NO MENTAL HEALTH ASSISTANCE

VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE ATTACKER'S FAMILY WERE AWARE DURING THE TIME LEADING UP TO THE ATTACKER'S 18TH BIRTHDAY THAT HE WAS ESTRANGED FROM HIS MOTHER AND THAT HE HAD ASKED FOR HELP IN BUYING GUNS THROUGH STRAW PURCHASES THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN ILLEGAL. FAMILY MEMBERS UNIFORMLY REFUSED TO BUY GUNS FOR HIM.

DURING THE WEEK BETWEEN HIS 18TH BIRTHDAY AND THE EVENTS OF MAY 24, 2022, THE ATTACKER EXPRESSED SUICIDAL IDEATION TO A COUSIN, WHO TALKED TO HIM AND DID NOT BELIEVE HE WAS AN IMMINENT SUICIDE RISK.

DURING THE WEEK BETWEEN HIS 18TH BIRTHDAY AND THE EVENTS OF MAY 24, 2022, THE ATTACKER'S GRANDPARENTS AND OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS BECAME AWARE THAT THE ATTACKER HAD BOUGHT GUNS. THE GRANDPARENTS DEMANDED THAT THE GUNS BE REMOVED FROM THEIR HOME.

### B. SCHOOL:

THE ATTACKER STRUGGLED ACADEMICALLY THROUGHOUT HIS TIME IN SCHOOL.

THE SCHOOL MADE NO MEANINGFUL INTERVENTION WITH THE ATTACKER BEFORE HE WAS INVOLUNTARILY WITHDRAWN FOR POOR ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE AND EXCESSIVE ABSENCES.

THE ATTACKER HAD FEW DISCIPLINARY ISSUES AT SCHOOL, BUT HE WAS SUSPENDED ONCE FOR A FIGHT.

DUE TO HIS EXCESSIVE ABSENCES, THERE APPARENTLY WAS NO INFORMATION ACTUALLY KNOWN TO THE SCHOOL DISTRICT THAT SHOULD HAVE IDENTIFIED THIS ATTACKER AS A THREAT TO ANY SCHOOL CAMPUS.

C. LAW ENFORCEMENT: THERE APPARENTLY WAS NO INFORMATION ACTUALLY KNOWN TO LOCAL UVALDE LAW ENFORCEMENT THAT SHOULD HAVE IDENTIFIED THIS ATTACKER AS A THREAT TO ANY SCHOOL CAMPUS BEFORE MAY 24, 2022.

D. FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES: SOME OF ATTACKER'S SOCIAL MEDIA CONTACTS RECEIVED MESSAGES FROM THE ATTACKER RELATED TO GUNS, SUGGESTING THAT HE WAS GOING TO DO



5. *SOCIAL MEDIA:*

- i. REPORTS SUGGEST THAT SOME SOCIAL-MEDIA USERS MAY HAVE REPORTED THE ATTACKER'S THREATENING BEHAVIOR TO THE RELEVANT SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS. THE SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS APPEAR TO HAVE NOT DONE ANYTHING IN RESPONSE TO RESTRICT THE ATTACKER'S SOCIAL MEDIA ACCESS OR REPORT HIS BEHAVIOR TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES.
- ii. THE SERVICES USED BY UVALDE CISD TO MONITOR SOCIAL MEDIA FOR THREATS DID NOT PROVIDE ANY ALERT OF THREATENING BEHAVIOR BY THE ATTACKER.

6. *FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION SELLERS:* THERE WAS NO LEGAL IMPEDIMENT TO THE ATTACKER BUYING TWO AR-15-STYLE RIFLES, 60 MAGAZINES, AND OVER 2,000 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION WHEN HE TURNED 18. THE ATF WAS NOT REQUIRED TO NOTIFY THE LOCAL SHERIFF OF THE MULTIPLE PURCHASES

## LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE ON MAY 24, 2022

1. THERE WAS NO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER ON THE ROBB ELEMENTARY CAMPUS WHEN THE ATTACKER CAME OVER THE FENCE AND TOWARD THE SCHOOL.
2. CITIZENS AT THE SCENE QUICKLY ALERTED LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ABOUT A VEHICLE ACCIDENT, A MAN WITH A GUN, AND SHOTS FIRED NEAR THE ROBB ELEMENTARY CAMPUS.
3. AS INITIALLY REPORTED BY UVALDE POLICE DISPATCH AND AS UNDERSTOOD BY MOST INITIAL RESPONDERS, THE INCIDENT BEGAN OFF-CAMPUS AND AS ONE THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE UVALDE POLICE DEPARTMENT. UVALDE POLICE OFFICERS WERE AMONG THE FIRST, IF NOT THE FIRST, LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONDERS ON THE SCENE AS A MAN FIRING A GUN MOVED TOWARD ROBB ELEMENTARY SCHOOL.
4. AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPED AND RESPONDERS RECEIVED MORE INFORMATION, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE THREAT MOVED ON TO THE SCHOOL CAMPUS AND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE UVALDE CISD POLICE DEPARTMENT.
5. MULTIPLE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ARRIVED AT ROBB ELEMENTARY WITHIN A FEW MINUTES OF THE ATTACKER COMING OVER THE FENCE.
6. A UVALDE POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICER SAW A PERSON DRESSED IN BLACK AND THOUGHT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN THE ATTACKER. FROM A DISTANCE OF OVER 100 YARDS, THAT OFFICER REQUESTED PERMISSION TO SHOOT. SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS SUGGESTS THAT THE PERSON IN BLACK WAS A SCHOOL COACH, AND THE OFFICER DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO STOP THE ATTACKER BY SHOOTING HIM BEFORE HE ENTERED THE WEST BUILDING.
7. ROBB ELEMENTARY SCHOOL COACH YVETTE SILVA ACTED HEROICALLY AND ALMOST CERTAINLY SAVED LIVES BY ALERTING THE SCHOOL TO THE ATTACKER'S ADVANCE. MOST FOURTH GRADE CLASSES SUCCESSFULLY LOCKED DOWN AS A RESULT OF HER QUICK RESPONSE.



8. BUILDING BEFORE FIRST RESPONDERS ARRIVED AT THE BUILDING, INCLUDING APPROXIMATELY TWO AND A HALF MINUTES DURING WHICH THE ATTACKER IS ESTIMATED TO HAVE FIRED OVER 100 ROUNDS.
9. THE INITIAL RESPONDERS TO THE WEST BUILDING HEARD GUNFIRE AND ENCOUNTERED A HALLWAY WITH A FOG OF DRYWALL DEBRIS, BULLET HOLES, AND EMPTY RIFLE CASINGS. THEY CONVERGED ON ROOMS 111 AND 112, WHICH THEY IDENTIFIED AS THE LOCATION OF THE ATTACKER. THEY ACTED APPROPRIATELY BY ATTEMPTING TO BREACH THE CLASSROOMS AND STOP THE ATTACKER. THE ATTACKER IMMEDIATELY REPELLED THEM WITH A BURST OF RIFLE FIRE FROM INSIDE THE CLASSROOMS.
10. THE RESPONDERS IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO ASSESS OPTIONS TO BREACH THE CLASSROOM, BUT THEY LOST CRITICAL MOMENTUM BY TREATING THE SCENARIO AS A “BARRICADED SUBJECT” INSTEAD OF WITH THE GREATER URGENCY ATTACHED TO AN “ACTIVE SHOOTER” SCENARIO.
11. IT ACTUALLY WAS AN “ACTIVE SHOOTER” SCENARIO BECAUSE THE ATTACKER WAS PREVENTING CRITICALLY INJURED VICTIMS FROM GETTING MEDICAL ATTENTION.
  - i. AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SCENARIO DIFFERS FROM A BARRICADED-SUBJECT SCENARIO IN THAT LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS RESPONDING TO AN ACTIVE SHOOTER ARE TRAINED TO PRIORITIZE THE SAFETY OF INNOCENT VICTIMS OVER THE SAFETY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONDERS.
  - ii. AT FIRST, THE FIRST RESPONDERS DID NOT HAVE “RELIABLE EVIDENCE” ABOUT WHETHER THERE WERE INJURED VICTIMS INSIDE ROOMS 111 AND 112, ALTHOUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STRONGLY SUGGESTED THAT POSSIBILITY, INCLUDING THE FACT THAT THE ATTACKER HAD FIRED MANY ROUNDS INSIDE CLASSROOMS AT A TIME WHEN STUDENTS WERE IN ATTENDANCE.
  - iii. THE ALERRT TRAINING “RELIABLE EVIDENCE” STANDARD DOES NOT ALIGN WITH THE “REASONABLE OFFICER” STANDARD APPLIED BY ALERRT IN ITS PRELIMINARY AND PARTIAL REPORT.
12. UVALDE CISD’S ACTIVE SHOOTER POLICY CALLED FOR UVALDE CISD POLICE CHIEF ARREDONDO TO BE THE INCIDENT COMMANDER IN ANY ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE.
  - i. CHIEF ARREDONDO WAS ONE OF THE FIRST RESPONDERS TO ARRIVE AT THE WEST BUILDING.
  - ii. IN THE INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE INCIDENT, CHIEF ARREDONDO WAS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN THE EFFORT TO “STOP THE KILLING” UP TO THE POINT WHEN THE ATTACKER WAS LOCATED IN ROOMS 111 AND 112, AND THE ATTACKER FIRED ON RESPONDING OFFICERS.
  - iii. BY THIS TIME, THERE WERE DOZENS OF OFFICERS ON THE SCENE, BUT CHIEF ARREDONDO DID NOT ASSUME HIS PREASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY OF INCIDENT COMMAND, WHICH WOULD HAVE ENTAILED INFORMING OTHER OFFICERS THAT HE



13. OVER THE COURSE OF THE NEXT HOUR, HUNDREDS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ARRIVED AT THE SCENE.
  - i. THE SCENE WAS CHAOTIC, WITHOUT ANY PERSON OBVIOUSLY IN CHARGE OR DIRECTING THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE.
  - ii. TO THE EXTENT ANY OFFICERS CONSIDERED CHIEF ARREDONDO TO BE THE OVERALL INCIDENT COMMANDER, THEY ALSO SHOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT WAS INCONSISTENT WITH HIM REMAINING INSIDE THE BUILDING.
  - iii. THERE WAS AN OVERALL LACKADAISICAL APPROACH BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AT THE SCENE. FOR MANY, THAT WAS BECAUSE THEY WERE GIVEN AND RELIED UPON INACCURATE INFORMATION. FOR OTHERS, THEY HAD ENOUGH INFORMATION TO KNOW BETTER.
14. DESPITE OBVIOUS DEFICIENCIES IN COMMAND AND CONTROL AT THE SCENE WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN RECOGNIZED BY OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONDERS, NONE APPROACHED CHIEF ARREDONDO OR ANY OF THE OFFICERS AROUND HIM OR SUBORDINATE TO HIM TO AFFIRMATIVELY OFFER ASSISTANCE WITH INCIDENT COMMAND.
15. CHIEF ARREDONDO AND THE OFFICERS AROUND HIM AT THE SOUTH END OF THE BUILDING WERE FOCUSED ON GAINING ACCESS TO THE CLASSROOMS (THROUGH USE OF A BREACHING TOOL, A KEY, OR OTHER MEANS) AND PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT FOR OFFICERS (THROUGH RIFLE-RATED BALLISTIC SHIELDS, FLASHBANGS, ETC.).
16. MEANWHILE, DOZENS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS WERE ASSEMBLING IN THE HALLWAY ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE BUILDING, STACKING UP FOR AN ASSAULT ON THE CLASSROOMS, AND MOSTLY WAITING FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS PENDING THE ARRIVAL OF PROTECTIVE GEAR AND BREACHING EQUIPMENT.
17. WHILE 911 RECEIVED COMMUNICATIONS FROM VICTIMS INSIDE ROOMS 111 AND 112, CHIEF ARREDONDO DID NOT LEARN ABOUT IT BECAUSE OF HIS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH A RELIABLE METHOD OF RECEIVING CRITICAL INFORMATION FROM OUTSIDE THE BUILDING.
18. EVENTUALLY, CHIEF ARREDONDO CAME TO UNDERSTAND THERE PROBABLY WERE CASUALTIES INSIDE ROOMS 111 AND 112. EVEN IF HE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION OF SURVIVING INJURED VICTIMS IN THE CLASSROOMS, IT IS UNCLEAR THAT HE WOULD HAVE DONE ANYTHING DIFFERENTLY TO ACT “MORE URGENTLY.”
19. U.S. MARSHALS PROVIDED A RIFLE-RATED SHIELD AND IT ARRIVED AROUND 12:20 P.M., APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES BEFORE THE CLASSROOM WAS FINALLY BREACHED.



20. WHILE OFFICERS ACTED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE DOORS TO ROOMS 111 AND 112 WERE LOCKED, AS THEY WERE DESIGNED TO BE, NOBODY TESTED THAT ASSUMPTION.
21. ROOM 111'S DOOR PROBABLY WAS NOT EFFECTIVELY LOCKED SHUT.
22. CHIEF ARREDONDO DID NOT ACTUALLY EXERCISE TACTICAL INCIDENT COMMAND OVER THE BORTAC TEAM, NOR DID THE BORTAC TEAM SEEK INSTRUCTION FROM CHIEF ARREDONDO.
23. BY THE TIME THE BORTAC TEAM BREACHED THE CLASSROOMS, THE TACTICAL COMMAND INSIDE THE BUILDING HAD BEEN DE FACTO ASSUMED BY BORTAC.
24. ACTING ON EFFECTIVELY THE SAME INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO CHIEF ARREDONDO, INCLUDING AN ASSUMPTION OF INJURED VICTIMS IN THE ROOM, THE BORTAC COMMANDER ON SCENE WAITED UNTIL ARRANGING A RIFLE-RATED SHIELD AND OBTAINING A WORKING MASTER KEY BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO BREACH THE CLASSROOMS.
25. THE COMMITTEE HAS NOT RECEIVED MEDICAL EVIDENCE THAT WOULD INFORM A JUDGMENT ABOUT WHETHER BREACHING THE CLASSROOM SOONER THAN THE APPROXIMATELY 73 MINUTES THAT PASSED BETWEEN THE FIRST RESPONDERS' INITIAL ARRIVAL AT THE WEST BUILDING AND THEIR EVENTUAL BREACH OF THE CLASSROOMS COULD HAVE BEEN SAVED LIVES OR MITIGATED INJURIES.
  - i. AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, IT IS LIKELY THAT MOST OF THE DECEASED VICTIMS PERISHED IMMEDIATELY DURING THE ATTACKER'S INITIAL BARRAGE OF GUNFIRE.
  - ii. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE INFORMATION KNOWN ABOUT VICTIMS WHO SURVIVED THROUGH THE TIME OF THE BREACH AND WHO LATER DIED ON THE WAY TO THE HOSPITAL, IT IS PLAUSIBLE THAT SOME VICTIMS COULD HAVE SURVIVED IF THEY HAD NOT HAD TO WAIT 73 ADDITIONAL MINUTES FOR RESCUE.

**MARJORY STONEMAN  
DOUGLAS HIGH SCHOOL  
PUBLIC SAFETY  
COMMISSION**





# Senate Bill 7030



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## CS/CS/SB 7030 — Implementation of Legislative Recommendations of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission

by Appropriations Committee; Infrastructure and Security Committee; and Education Committee

This summary is provided for information only and does not represent the opinion of any Senator, Senate Officer, or Senate Office.

Prepared by: Education Committee (ED)

The bill addresses the school safety and security recommendations of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission, and strengthens accountability and compliance oversight authority.

### School Security

The bill enhances school security measures. Specifically, the bill:

- Requires sheriffs to assist district school boards and charter school governing boards in complying with safe-school officer requirements, including providing guardian training either directly or through a contract with another sheriff's office under specified circumstances.
- Requires district school boards to collaborate with charter school governing boards to facilitate charter school access to all safe-school officer options. If a district school board denies a charter school access to any of the safe-school officer options, the school district must assign a school resource officer or school safety officer to the charter school and retain the charter school's share of the costs from the safe schools allocation.
- Delineates that the four safe-school officer options include a school resource officer, a school safety officer, school guardian, and a school security guard. The bill specifies that:
  - A school guardian may be a school district employee or a charter school employee who volunteers to serve as a school guardian in addition to his or her official job duties or an employee of a school district or a charter school who is hired for the specific purpose of serving as a school guardian. The bill removes the prohibition on an individual who exclusively performs duties as a classroom teacher from participating in the guardian program.
  - A school security guard must hold a Class "D" and Class "G" license in accordance with the law and meet the training requirements equivalent to that of a school guardian as a safe-school officer.
- Continues to require a district school board to opt-in to the guardian program through a majority vote and require employees who volunteer to pass a psychological evaluation and complete 144 hours of required training. The bill also requires the employee to complete the required training to the Sheriff's satisfaction and then be appointed by the superintendent or charter school principal, as applicable.
- Applies the penalties specified in law relating to the false personation of a law enforcement officer to the false personation of a school guardian and a licensed security officer.

# Senate Bill 7030

## *Student Safety*

The bill improves student safety by establishing information sharing and reporting requirements for district school boards and charter school governing boards, including responses to emergency situations, safety incident reporting, data collection, and data sharing. Specifically, the bill:

- Requires each district school board and charter school governing board to adopt an active assailant response plan; and annually by October 1, requires each district school superintendent and charter school principal to certify that all school personnel have received annual training on the procedures contained in the plan.
- Requires drills for active shooter and hostage situations to be conducted in accordance with developmentally appropriate and age-appropriate procedures.
- Requires each district school board to define criteria for reporting to a law enforcement agency any act that poses a threat to school safety as well as acts of misconduct which are not a threat to school safety and do not require consultation with law enforcement.
- Requires that the Florida Safe Schools Assessment Tool (FSSAT) be the primary physical site security assessment tool used by school officials at each school district and public school site in conducting security assessments; and requires each school district to report to the Department of Education (DOE) by October 15 that all schools within the district have completed the school security risk assessment using the FSSAT.
- Enhances oversight and enforcement as it relates to School Environmental and Safety Incident Reporting (SESIR) by requiring school districts and charter schools to report specified incidents; and requires the OSS to collect, review, and evaluate data regarding the reports to ensure compliance with the reporting requirements.
- Requires district school boards and charter schools to promote the use of the mobile suspicious activity reporting tool by advertising the tool on its website, school campuses, newsletters, and install the application on all mobile devices and bookmark the website on all computer devices issued to students.
- Modifies requirements relating to new student registration and transfer of student records by clarifying the mental health services-related reporting requirements at the time of initial registration and specifying the information that must be transferred from one public school to another upon a student's transfer.

The bill modifies requirements relating to school district threat assessment teams by:

- Requiring the threat assessment team to use the behavioral threat assessment instrument that is developed by the OSS in accordance with the law.
- Requiring, upon a student's transfer to a different school, a threat assessment team to verify that any intervention services provided to the student remain in place until the threat assessment team of the receiving school independently determines the need for intervention services.

The bill adds authority and responsibilities for the OSS. Specifically, the bill requires the OSS to:

- Annually publish a list including information about the number of safe-school officers in the state and information related to disciplinary incidents involving such officers.
- Make the FSSAT available annually by May 1, and provide annual training to each district's school safety specialist and other appropriate personnel on the assessment of physical site school security and completing the FSSAT.
- Specifies additional data that must be included in the centralized integrated data repository in coordination with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE).
- Develop, no later than August 1, 2019, a standardized, statewide behavioral threat assessment instrument for use by all K-12 public schools and evaluate, by August 1, 2020, each school district's and charter school governing board's behavioral threat assessment procedures for compliance with the law.
- Establish a Statewide Threat Assessment Database Workgroup to complement the work of the DOE and the FDLE associated with the centralized integrated data repository and data analytics resources initiative. The workgroup must make recommendations regarding the development of a statewide threat assessment database to provide access to information about any school threat assessment to authorized personnel in each school district. The workgroup must provide a report to the OSS with recommendations that include specified components, no later than December 31, 2019.
- Convene a School Hardening and Harm Mitigation Workgroup comprised of individuals with subject matter expertise on school campus hardening best practices to review school hardening and harm mitigation policies, and submit a report to the executive director of the OSS by August 1, 2020, including a prioritized list for the implementation of school campus hardening and harm mitigation strategies, and related estimated costs and timeframes. The bill also specifies reporting requirements and related deadlines for the OSS and the Commissioner of Education regarding recommendations for policy and funding enhancements and strategies for implementing school campus hardening.
- Monitor school district and charter school compliance with school safety requirements.



# Senate Bill 7030

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- Monitor school district and charter school compliance with school safety requirements.

## *School District Funding*

The bill provides funding opportunities to enhance school safety and security, and to provide additional mental health services to students. Specifically, the bill:

- Retroactively provides school districts with flexibility for expending 2018-2019 fiscal year safe schools allocation funds for employing or contracting for safe-school officers.
- Provides school districts with greater flexibility to improve school safety by authorizing the transfer of categorical funds within the Florida Education Finance Program towards school safety expenditures, and expands authorized uses of the safe schools allocation.
- Expands the authorized uses of the mental health assistance allocation, provides school district flexibility for expenditures, and requires a program and expenditure plan for school districts and charter schools.

If approved by the Governor, these provisions take effect upon becoming law, except for the provisions related to the safe schools allocation and mental health allocation which are effective July 1, 2019, and the retroactive funding provisions related to the 2018-2019 safe schools allocation.

*Vote: Senate 22-17; House 65-47*



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## Florida Safe Schools Assessment Tool Cover Sheet

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
# FSSAT FLORIDA SAFE SCHOOL ASSESSMENT TOOL



# GUARDIAN TRAINING

2. A sheriff who establishes a program shall consult with the Department of Law Enforcement on programmatic guiding principles, practices, and resources, and shall certify as school guardians, without the power of arrest, school employees, as specified in s. 1006.12(3), who:

- a. Hold a valid license issued under s. 790.06.
- b. Complete a 144-hour training program, consisting of 12 hours of certified nationally recognized diversity training and 132 total hours of comprehensive firearm safety and proficiency training conducted by Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission-certified instructors, which must include:
  - (I) Eighty hours of firearms instruction based on the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission's Law Enforcement Academy training model, which must include at least 10 percent but no more than 20 percent more rounds fired than associated with academy training. Program participants must achieve an 85 percent pass rate on the firearms training.
  - (II) Sixteen hours of instruction in precision pistol.
  - (III) Eight hours of discretionary shooting instruction using state-of-the-art simulator exercises.
  - (IV) Eight hours of instruction in active shooter or assailant scenarios.
  - (V) Eight hours of instruction in defensive tactics.
  - (VI) Twelve hours of instruction in legal issues.
- c. Pass a psychological evaluation administered by a psychologist licensed under chapter 490 and designated by the Department of Law Enforcement and submit the results of the evaluation to the sheriff's office. The Department of Law Enforcement is authorized to provide the sheriff's office with mental health and substance abuse data for compliance with this paragraph.
- d. Submit to and pass an initial drug test and subsequent random drug tests in accordance with the requirements of s. 112.0455 and the sheriff's office.
- e. Successfully complete ongoing training, weapon inspection, and firearm qualification on at least an annual basis.






TIME

- 36% ENDED IN 2 MINUTES OR LESS
- 69% ENDED IN 5 MINUTES OR LESS

FBI

U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation



**A STUDY OF THE  
PRE-ATTACK BEHAVIORS  
OF ACTIVE SHOOTERS  
IN THE UNITED STATES**  
*BETWEEN 2000 AND 2013*

JUNE 2018



**2021**

**Averting Targeted School Violence**

A U.S. SECRET SERVICE ANALYSIS OF  
PLOTS AGAINST SCHOOLS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE  
**NATIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT CENTER**




# 10 Critical Warning Signs of Violence

---

1. Suddenly **withdrawing** from friends, family and activities (including online or via social media)
2. **Bullying**, especially if targeted towards **differences in race, religion, gender or sexual orientation**
3. **Excessive** irritability, lack of patience, or becoming angry quickly
4. Experiencing **chronic loneliness or social isolation**
5. Expressing **persistent thoughts of harming** themselves or someone else
6. Making **direct threats** toward a place, another person, or themselves
7. Bragging about **access to guns** or weapons
8. Recruiting accomplices or audiences for an **attack**
9. Directly **expressing a threat** as a plan
10. **Cruelty** to animals.

# SCHOOL SHOOTINGS - LEADING THE WAY IN THE NEW NORMAL

- SCHOOL SAFETY SPECIALIST (SCHOOL IDENTIFIED)
- CRITICAL INCIDENT GUIDE BOOK
  - ALL STAFF HAS ACCESS AND IT IS EASILY LOCATED AND DISPLAYED
- SCHOOL DRILLS
  - LOCKDOWN (ACTIVE SHOOTER) 10
  - LIMITED LOCKDOWN (HEIGHTENED SECURITY)
- SCHOOL SAFETY TEAMS(AP, SRO's, COUNSELORS)
  - SCHOOL SAFETY ASSESSMENT TOOL FSSAT
- THREAT ASSESSMENT TEAM (SB 7030)
  - LAW ENFORCEMENT MANDATED ON TEAM
  - ALL THREATS
  - REPORT BY SAFE SCHOOL OFFICER





# ***SCHOOL SHOOTINGS - LEADING THE WAY IN THE NEW NORMAL***

- ACCESS CARDS
- PANIC BUTTONS
- FENCING
  - SINGLE POINT OF ENTRY
- COMMUNICATIONS ON CAMPUS
  - SAFETY AUDIT/RADIOS
- LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO SCHOOL CAMERAS
  - REAL TIME RESPONSE
- EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS ONLINE
  - EVACUATION LOCATIONS
  - SRO ACTIVE SHOOTER

# Lock Down Drill Documentation

## THE SCHOOL BOARD OF SARASOTA COUNTY, FLORIDA SCHOOL SAFETY AND SECURITY

### EMERGENCY DRILL/EXERCISE REPORT

**Instructions:** This report is part of our evacuation drill, as required by the National Fire Protection Act NFPA, 101 Life Safety Code Chapter 15.7.2.2(1) and Florida Statute 1006.07(4)(a). Drills cannot be combined. Only one drill per exercise. All drills must occur during normal school hours. This form must be filed within 24 hours of the drill/exercise. The original form is kept on site and a copy should be emailed to the Outlook group distribution list, Emergency Drill Report.

Type of Drill	Required Per Year	Drill # This Year	Notes
<input type="checkbox"/> Fire Drill	10		1 drill per month*
<input type="checkbox"/> Weather/Tornado	2		1 during National Weather Week
<input type="checkbox"/> Emergency Non-Fire Evacuation	1		1 by 10/15
<input type="checkbox"/> Emergency Lockdown	10		1 drill per month
<input type="checkbox"/> Other	0		

\*The first fire drill must be completed within the first 5 days of each semester

School Name \_\_\_\_\_

School Principal Name or Designated Person in Charge Name \_\_\_\_\_

Drill Date \_\_\_\_\_ Drill Time \_\_\_\_\_ ☐ AM ☐ PM

Number of Students Involved \_\_\_\_\_ Time Required To Complete Drill \_\_\_\_\_

Special Notes Regarding Drill (ex: missing child, forced secondary egress practice drill) \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Did an outside First Responder Agency assist in this exercise? ☐ Yes ☐ No

If yes, provide the Agency Name \_\_\_\_\_

Provide any comments and recommendations made by the Agency associated with this drill/exercise \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Distribution: Original – On Site Copy: e-mail to EMERGENCY DRILL REPORT (using the Outlook distribution list)

RET: Master, 2CY, GS1-SL 259  
Dupl., OSA

029-15-SAF  
Eff. 6-17-2019



- **SAFE CORNER**
  - **NOT VISIBLE FROM THE DOOR WINDOW**
  - **WINDOWS COVERED**
  - **DROP DOWN OR WINDOW FILM**
- **MOBILE APPLICATION FOR LOCK DOWN OR STAFF TO IMMEDIATELY**
  - **ALL STAFF CALL FOR A LOCK DOWN**
  - **ALL DISTRICT EMPLOYEES (EVERYONE)**
  - **WI-FI ENABLED**
- **LAW ENFORCEMENT KNOX BOXES**
- **ACTIVE SHOOTER POLICY**









# Alyssa's Law- Alyssa Alhadeff 14

[MyFloridaHouse.gov](http://MyFloridaHouse.gov) | [Mobile Site](#)

Senate Tracker: [Sign Up](#) | [Login](#)



THE  
FLORIDA SENATE

Go to Bill: Bill # 2020  Find Statutes: 2020  Search Term Chapter  Search Site

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[Home](#) > [Committees](#) > [Committee Publications](#) > [2020 Bill Summaries](#) > Bill Summary

## CS/CS/SB 70 – Alert Systems in Public Schools

[Go to Bill: SB 70](#)

by Appropriations Committee; Infrastructure and Security Committee; and Senators Book, Berman, Stewart, and Torres

This summary is provided for information only and does not represent the opinion of any Senator, Senate Officer, or Senate Office.

Prepared by: Infrastructure and Security Committee (IS)

### Downloads

- [PDF of this Summary \(PDF\)](#)
- [All 2020 Bill Summaries for Infrastructure and Security Committee \(PDF\)](#)

The bill creates “Alyssa’s Law” and modifies school safety statute to require each public school, including charter schools, beginning with the 2021-2022 school year, to implement a mobile panic alert system, known as “Alyssa’s Alert.” The system must be capable of connecting diverse emergency services technologies to ensure real-time coordination between multiple first responder agencies.

A public school district may implement additional strategies or systems to any implemented mobile panic alert system to ensure real-time coordination between multiple first responder agencies in a school security emergency.

For the 2020-2021 fiscal year and subject to legislative appropriation, the Department of Education, in consultation with the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and the Division of Emergency Management is required to develop a competitive solicitation to contract for a mobile panic alert system that may be used by each school district.


If approved by the Governor, these provisions take effect July 1, 2020.

Vote: Senate 40-0; House 119-0






# EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLATFORMS

 **VISITOR AWARE**

[FEATURES](#) [BLOG](#) [CONTACT](#) [PRICING](#) [LOGIN](#)


## Included for Every School

Every customer deserves the best technology on the planet. No excuses.




### Visitor Management

Check your visitors and volunteers in, and out in seconds using an iPad without any interruption to your office staff. Our visitor management service does not require any additional or proprietary hardware.




### Emergency Management

Drills, alerts, and emergency management at your fingertips with Visitor Aware Watchdog application for iOS and Android. Private. Immediate. Accurate. Secure.




### Student Management

Track attendance, tardy, roster, and sign-in/out instances with our student management capabilities.




### Volunteer Management

Effortlessly manage all volunteers




### Family Reunification

Streamline family reunification after



### Tipline

Our tipline feature allows our community





[HOME](#) [FEATURES](#) [HOW IT WORKS](#) [SCREENSHOTS](#) [ABOUT](#) [ESPAÑOL](#)

# Suspicious Activity Reporting App

FortifyFL is a suspicious activity reporting tool that allows you to instantly relay information to appropriate law enforcement agencies and school officials.

 [Submit A Tip Online](#)

 [Download On The App Store](#)

 [Get It On Google Play](#)





# MOU'S WITH AGENCIES

- **MOU'S WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SCHOOL DISTRICT**
  - **INTELLIGENCE SHARING**
  - **SOCIAL MEDIA THREATS/ RESPONSE**
- **WRITTEN ACTIVE SHOOTER POLICY WITH SHALL**
- **COMMUNICATION ASSESSMENTS ON CAMPUS**
  - **DEAD SPOTS/RADIO AUDITS**
- **DRILLS WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES**
  - **TABLE TOPS SCENARIO BASED**
  - **MULTIPLE AGENCY RESPONSE**

# Active Shooter Policy

## Sarasota County Schools Police Department General Order 28.2



<b>TITLE: Active Shooter Response</b>		
<b>ORIGINATION DATE: 02/19/2019</b>	<b>REVISION DATE:</b>	
<b>RELATED REFERENCES:</b>	<b>RESCINDS GO:</b>	
<b>REVIEWED: 02/19/2019</b>	<b>REVIEWED:</b>	<b>REVIEWED:</b>

- I. PURPOSE:** To establish guidelines and procedures for the response to, and handling of, situations involving active shooters.
- II. SCOPE:** This order shall apply to all sworn/certified Sarasota County School Police Department (SCSPD) members and select civilian members.
- 
- III. POLICY:** It is the policy of the SCSPD to allow and encourage the proper use of discretion by members in the performance of their duties. Use of discretion must be within the limits of legal, ethical and moral behavior, and as established by the policies and procedures of this agency.
- 

#### **IV. PROCEDURE:**

**A. Contact Teams:** The first officer to arrive the incident scene will assess the situation, advise dispatch, and shall immediately deploy as a one man contact team in an effort to neutralize the active shooter.

1. As officers arrive on scene at the same time and after assessment determine that immediate action is necessary, they will advise dispatch, form a multiple officer contact team, and shall immediately deploy.
2. Contact teams will continuously relay information to the incident commander and dispatch as they attempt to locate the threat.
3. Contact teams will continue to search for the active shooter(s) until contact is made, the scene is considered safe, or the incident evolves and other critical incident tactics become appropriate (i.e. hostage situation, barricaded suspect, etc.).



# SRO STAFFING

- SRO/ STUDENTS RATIO
  - DECISION FACTORS/ METHODOLOGY
    - WEAPONS ON CAMPUS
    - VIOLENT CRIMES ON CAMPUS
    - TOTAL LAND AREA OF CAMPUS
    - NUMBER OF BUILDINGS
    - AGE OF STUDENTS (GRADE LEVELS)
    - TOTAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS SCHOOL SPECIFIC
    - CRIME DATA IN COMMUNITY
      - GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF SCHOOL
    - STATE REPORTING DATA (SESIR)
    - SCHOOL DISTRICT AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DECISION AT A COUNTY LEVEL

SRO  
FOUNDATION  
PRINCIPLES

- **SRO MODEL TRIAD CONCEPT**
  - **TEACHER**
  - **COUNSELOR**
  - **LAW ENFORCEMENT**
- **\*\*\*\*RELATIONSHIPS PREVENT SCHOOL SHOOTINGS**
- **SRO'S ONLY ENFORCE CRIMINAL LAW, NOT POLICIES**
- **ASSIST STAFF, NOT DISCIPLINARIANS**



# SRO'S: THEIR ROLE AND OPERATIONAL BEST PRACTICES

- RESPONSIBILITIES
  - #1 SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE STUDENTS AND FACULTY
  - REGULAR REVIEW AND UPDATES OF CRITICAL INCIDENT PLANS
  - KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVE SHOOTER BEST PRACTICES AND RESPONSE
  - CPTED ASSESSMENTS OF PHYSICAL SCHOOL
  - SYSTEMATICALLY UNSYSTEMATIC PATROL OF CAMPUS
  - MENTOR AND COUNSELOR
    - BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS
  - A RESOURCE TO THE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION FOR COMMUNITY OUTREACH PROGRAMS



## Sarasota County School Police Department Athletic Event Plan



### EXECUTION

Assigned SCSPD, fire department and other law enforcement personnel will report to the predetermined location for a supervisory and school administrative briefing prior to the event. Based upon the recommendation of the athletic director, school administration and SCSPD representative, officer(s) will be assigned predetermined locations to staff the event. SRO's assigned to the event location will have the first opportunity to fill any requests for officers. Once the SRO has accepted or denied the assignment, other SCSPD SRO's will be given the opportunity to fill the request. If the SCSPD SRO's can't meet the requirement of the request outside agencies will be given the opportunity to fill any vacant openings. The total staffing level shall be consistent based upon a variety of factors to include: the total anticipated attendees, rivalry games etc. Sarasota County Schools Police Department in conjunction with other law enforcement agencies will fully staff the event as per the request as listed above. It is best practice for span of control regarding law enforcement officers, that for every 5 officers assigned at the event, 1 SCSPD or other law enforcement agency supervisor will be designated as the officer in charge (OIC). All events requiring more than five officers will require a supervisor to be assigned to the event. Events requiring five or less officers, one officer will be designated as the event supervisor, this will be assigned by seniority or rank (if from an outside agency). All requests and changes of officer responsibilities shall be relayed to the OIC at which time they will notify the officers affected by the change in assignment. It is requested that all coordination of officer changes in assignment be approved by the OIC. Law enforcement personnel will be tasked with ensuring the safety of all attendees, maintaining order, coordinate post locations and any subsequent changes. Officers will continue with their assigned responsibilities through post game to include traffic direct upon request. All officers assigned to the event will use the main radio frequency of the jurisdiction of the location of the event. This will include notifying dispatch of their arrival and departure for dispatching purposes. The event plan shall be submitted and approved at least 14 days prior to event to provide adequate notification of staffing.

### BAG SEARCHES

All bags may be subject to search by school administration or personnel up entry into the event. Please see attached notice of approved items for events. In situations where attendees refuse the search, they will have the opportunity to secure the item in their vehicle or will not be allowed to enter the event.

### MEDICAL SUPPORT

In the event medical care is needed, officers will request the appropriate resource using the assigned radio channel through the dispatch center.

### LOCKDOWN

A Lockdown is used to protect occupants from potential dangers inside a building or from external threats (i.e., Active Shooter(s)). In the event of a Lockdown, law enforcement officers will immediately assist in the protection of all attendees. The OIC will immediately notify dispatch of the lockdown and request additional resources. School administrators and staff will assist with the directives of the OIC.

### EVACUATION

**Severe weather evacuation**--The school administrator or athletic director shall make the determination of an evacuation due to severe weather. If the event is suspended or cancelled due to severe weather, such as lightning, power outage etc., all officers will assist in the evacuation of attendees. It will be requested that attendees to find shelter in their personal vehicles or a designated area determined by the school for temporary shelter.

**Law enforcement evacuation**-- The OIC shall make the determination of an evacuation due to circumstances as it related to attendee safety. All officers will assist in the evacuation of attendees as it will be requested that attendees find shelter in their personal vehicles or a designated area determined by the school for temporary shelter. The OIC will immediately contact dispatch to notify them of the evacuation and to request additional resources.

### SUSPECTED ALCOHOL/DRUG INTOXICATION

If a staff member suspects or is notified that an attendee is suspected of being under the influence of alcohol/drugs, law enforcement will be contacted and assist with the removal of the subject or provide any appropriate services.

### ADDITIONAL SPECIALTY RESOURCES

Requests for additional or specialized law enforcement units/resources shall be made to and approved by the OIC. The OIC shall contact the appropriate watch commander to request the needed assistance.

**\*\*\* PLAN MUST BE SUBMITTED NO LATER THAN 14 CALENDAR DAYS PRIOR TO THE EVENT \*\*\***



 <p>THE SCHOOL BOARD OF BREVARD COUNTY FLORIDA COMMUNITY SERVICE CENTER 200 SOUTH FLORIDA AVENUE MELBOURNE, FLORIDA 32901</p>	<p><b>SITE</b></p> <p>BOOKER HIGH SCHOOL 3351 400 NORTH ORANGE AVENUE BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA 35204</p>		DATE	06/08/2013
	ASU/ST/MS	607		
	ASU/MS	608		
	ASU/MS	609		
	ASU/MS	610		
<p>PROPERTY</p> <p>1000</p>				

**Officers Assigned:** \_\_\_\_\_

**School SRO:** \_\_\_\_\_

Signature

Signature





# **THE FINAL REPORT AND FINDINGS OF THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE:**

IMPLICATIONS FOR  
THE PREVENTION OF  
SCHOOL ATTACKS IN  
THE UNITED STATES

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION



# SOCIAL MEDIA AND IT'S IMPACT ON SCHOOL SAFETY

THREAT ASSESSMENT TEAM

SUICIDE AND HOMICIDAL IDEATION

POLICY

LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO HOUSE (24 HOURS)

DOCUMENTATION OF CONTACT AND ACCESS TO WEAPONS

NO RETURN TO SCHOOL UNTIL MEET W/THREAT ASSESSMENT TEAM

SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS IN PLACE

FOLLOW UP FOR COMPLIANCE

MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENTS



## A FRESH TAKE ON SOCIAL MEDIA

RESEARCHERS HAVE FOUND FOR YEARS THAT YOUNGER GENERATIONS ARE LONELIER THAN THEIR PARENTS, AND MANY STUDIES BLAME TRADITIONAL SOCIAL MEDIA FOR THAT DIVIDE. "YOUNG PEOPLE WITH MODERATE TO SEVERE DEPRESSIVE SYMPTOMS ARE NEARLY TWICE AS LIKELY AS THOSE WITHOUT DEPRESSION TO SAY THEY USE SOCIAL MEDIA ALMOST CONSTANTLY (34% vs. 18%)," ACCORDING TO A REPORT FROM COMMON SENSE MEDIA RELEASED WEDNESDAY.

-SINCE THE INCEPTION OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN 2009 THERE HAS BEEN A 70% INCREASE IN SUICIDE IN FEMALES AGES 15- 19 AND 151% INCREASE AGES 10-14.(CDC)





# Social Media and It's Impact on School Safety



# Social Media and It's Impact on School Safety

**MYLOL**






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City

Area

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# SOCIAL MEDIA THREAT ALERTS



**DO SOMETHING!!!**



# ***SCHOOL SHOOTINGS - LEADING THE WAY IN THE NEW NORMAL***

TIMOTHY ENOS

CHIEF OF POLICE (RETIRED)

SARASOTA COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

POLICE DEPARTMENT

SARASOTA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD

SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER DISTRICT 5

[TIM@TIMENOS.COM](mailto:TIM@TIMENOS.COM)

941-894-5167